As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term stealthy has come to encompass a variety of techniques that attackers can employ to avoid being detected. In this manuscript, for a class of perturbed linear time-invariant systems, we propose two security metrics to quantify the potential impact that stealthy attacks could have on the system dynamics by tampering with sensor measurements. We provide analysis mathematical tools (in terms of linear matrix inequalities) to quantify these metrics for given system dynamics, control structure, system monitor, and set of sensors being attacked. Then, we provide synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs) to redesign controllers and monitors such that the impact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required attack-free system performance is guaranteed.
Introduction
Recently, there has been significant interest and work in the broad area of security of Networked Control Systems (NCSs), see, e.g., [1, 2, 7, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 38] . This topic investigates properties of conventional control systems in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Control theory has shown great ability to robustly deal with disturbances and uncertainties. However, adversarial attacks raise all-new issues due to the aggressive and strategic nature of the disturbances that attackers might inject into the system. This paper focuses on quantifying and minimizing attacker capabilities in NCSs. A majority of the work on attack detection leverages the established literature of fault detection [7, 9, 22, 32] . A fault detection approach uses an estimator to forecast the evolution of the system dynamics. When the residual (the difference between measurements and their estimates) is larger than This paper was not presented at any IFAC meeting. Corresponding author Carlos Murguia.
Email addresses: carlos.murguia@unimelb.edu.au (Carlos Murguia), iman.shames@unimelb.edu.au (Iman Shames), jruths@utdallas.edu (Justin Ruths), dnesic@unimelb.edu.au (Dragan Nešić). a predetermined threshold, an alarm is raised. Arguably the most insidious attacks are those that occur without our knowledge. Fault detectors impose limits on attacks if the attacker aims at avoiding being identified. Beyond retooling these existing methods for the new attack detection context, a fundamental question is: given a chosen fault detection approach, how does this method constrain the influence of an attacker? More specifically, what is an attacker able to accomplish when a system employs certain fault detection procedure? Different methodologies exist for evaluating the impact of attacks. Most of the existing work uses some measure of state deviation. A number of groups have studied the system response when attacks are constrained by the detector, i.e., they investigate the system trajectories that can be induced due to stealthy attacks -attacks such that the detector threshold is never crossed [8, 12, 14, 16, 28, 31, 32] . In this manuscript, for given system dynamics, we provide mathematical tools for quantifying and minimizing the potential impact of sensor stealthy attacks on the system dynamics. We consider the set of states that stealthy attacks can induce in the system (the attacker's stealthy reachable set) and use the "size" of this set as a security metric for the NCS. Stealthy reachable sets provide a metric of the system performance degradation induced by stealthy attacks.
Because it is not mathematically tractable to compute these sets exactly, we provide analysis tools -in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) -for computing ellipsoidal outer approximations of the attacker's reachable sets. The obtained approximations quantify the attacker's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. We use the size (in terms of volume) of these ellipsoidal approximations to approximate the proposed security metric. As a second security metric, we propose the minimum distance from the attacker's reachable set to a possible set of critical statesstates that, if reached, compromise the integrity or safe operation of the system. We approximate this distance by the minimum distance between the ellipsoidal approximations and the critical states. This distance gives us intuition on how far the actual attacker's reachable set is from the critical states. Once we have provided a complete set of analysis tools to approximate the aforementioned security metrics, we use these tools to derive synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs) to redesign controllers and fault detectors such that the impact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required attack-free system performance is guaranteed.
There are a few results in this direction already; chiefly the work in [27] (and the preliminary paper [26] ), where the authors provide a recursive algorithm to compute ellipsoidal approximations of attacker's reachable sets for Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems subjected to Gaussian noise. The authors in [27] give analysis-only results for a very particular structure of controllers and faultdetectors. They consider Kalman-filter based fault detectors and use the state of the filter to construct output feedback controllers. Although this results in compact designs of controllers and fault detectors, the flexibility of having dedicated controllers and detectors (mainly for synthesis of secure control systems) is limited. We remark that, in the stochastic setting considered in [27] , the detector threshold is always crossed even when there are no attacks. This is due to the infinite support of the Gaussian noise they consider. Thus, they do not consider stealthy attacks in the sense described above. Instead, they consider attacks that increase the alarm rate of the detector by a small amount only. Then, they approximate the attacker's reachable set corresponding to this small increase. The main contributions of this manuscript (in contrast to the work in [27] ) are the following: 1) we provide a set of mathematical tools in terms of semidefinite programs to approximate reachable sets induced by stealthy attacks for LTI systems driven by peak bounded deterministic perturbations; 2) we provide both analysis and synthesis results for dedicated general dynamic output feedback controllers and observer-based fault detectors; 3) we propose two security metrics to assess the vulnerability of systems to attacks, and optimize these metrics (enhancing thus the system resilience to attacks) by synthesizing optimal controllers and detectors; 4) the synthesis part considers the attack-free performance of the closed-loop dynamics, i.e., we optimize the security metrics subject to certain prescribed attack-free system performance. In our preliminary work [31] , we also approximate reachable sets of false-data-injection attacks but we consider the same stochastic framework as the one proposed in [27] , i.e., Gaussian noise, joint Kalmanfilter based fault detectors and controllers, and attacks increasing the alarm rate of the detector. Thus, the problems considered in this manuscript (and the obtained results) and the ones addressed in [31] are fundamentally different; and the set of results (and the tools used to obtain them) are different too. Moreover, in [31] , we consider attacks to all the sensors. Although the latter case provides a worse-case scenario, we lose the capability of quantifying the sensitivity of the system dynamics to attacks on specific sensors. As in [27] , the results in [31] mainly focus on analysis (although they hint how to address synthesis for joint Kalman-filter based detectors and controllers).
There are a few other results that considers different security metrics for control systems. All of them are fundamentally different to the work presented here. For instance, in [2, 3] , for arbitrary detection procedures, the authors quantify how much the attacker can increase the asymptotic covariance (their security metric) of state estimates while remaining stealthy. They characterize stealthiness using the Kullback-Leibler Divergence [33] between the attack-free and the attacked estimates. In [37, 39] , the authors use the notion of security index for LTI systems. This index refers to the smallest number of sensors and actuators that have to be compromised for successfully launching stealthy attacks. For linear stochastic systems, the authors is [24] propose two security metrics: the probability that some of the critical states leave a safety region; and the expected value of the infinity norm of the critical states. Finally, in [25] , tools from finance risk theory are used to quantify security of LTI systems. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some preliminaries results needed for the subsequent sections. We provide tools for computing outer time-varying bounds on the trajectories of a class of perturbed nonlinear discrete-time systems. Then, we use these tools to obtain outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by multiple peak bounded perturbations. The system dynamics, monitor, and controller descriptions are given in Section 3. Our proposed security metrics and analysis tools, together with some numerical results, are given in Section 4; and the corresponding synthesis results are given in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are stated in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present some preliminary results needed for the subsequent sections. First, in Lemma 1, we present a preliminary tool used to compute outer time-varying bounds on the trajectories of perturbed discrete-time systems. Next, in Proposition 1, we use this lemma to compute outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by multiple peak bounded perturbations.
Lemma 1 For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist functions a i k : N → (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , N , and V :
k ≥ a and, for all k ∈ N, the inequality:
Using (4) to upper bound (3) and continuing the recursion yields
Next, we present a tool to identify outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets of LTI systems driven by multiple peak bounded perturbations. Consider the perturbed LTI system
. . , N , N ∈ N, and matrices A ∈ R n ξ ×n ξ and 
) reachable in k steps by system (5) through all possible perturbations satisfying
. Proposition 1 Consider the LTI system (5) and the reachable set R ξ k introduced in Definition 1. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants a 1 =ã 1 , . . . , a N =ã N and matrix P =P ∈ R n ξ ×n ξ satisfying:
with
Proof: For a positive definite matrix P ∈ R n ξ ×n ξ , let
T , and the inequality
T . This inequality is satisfied if and only if Q is positive semidefinite. This Q can be written as the Schur complement of a higher dimensional matrix Q ; it follows that Q ≥ 0 ↔ Q ≥ 0 where
Consider the congruence transformation Q → T T Q T , [5] for details. Inequality T T Q T ≥ 0 equals the last inequality in (6) . Then, by Lemma 1, we have ξ
. . , m, and P =P satisfying (6) . It follows that the trajectories ξ k generated by
k , the initial condition ξ 1 , and the perturbation ω k , are always contained in the time-varying ellipsoidẼ 
∞ provides an ultimate bound [17] for the timevarying ellipsoidal approximationẼ . Then, to makeẼ ξ k less conservative, we aim at obtaining ellipsoids with minimal volume, i.e., the tightest possible ellipsoid bounding R ξ k among all the ellipsoids generated by Proposition 1. To find such an ellipsoid, we look to minimize (det[P]) −1/2 subject to (6) because (det[P]) −1/2 is proportional to the volume of the asymptotic ellipsoid ξ T Pξ = (N − a)/(1 − a) for any N ∈ N and a ∈ (0, 1) [5] . We minimize log det[P −1 ] instead as it shares the same minimizer with (det[P]) −1/2 and because for positive definite P this objective is convex [5] . This is stated in the following corollary of Proposition 1. Corollary 1 Consider the perturbed LTI system (5) and the reachable set R ξ k introduced in Definition 1. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants a 1 = a * 1 , . . . , a N = a * N and matrix P = P * solution of the convex optimization:
over, for any a i =ã i = a * i and P =P = P * satisfying the constraints in (6) and corresponding ellipsoidal approximationẼ ξ k , the volume of E ξ ∞ (see (7) ) is strictly less than the volume ofẼ ξ ∞ , i.e., E ξ k has the minimum asymptotic volume among all the outer ellipsoidal approxima- Proof: The solution space of the objective function is convex because the constraints are linear [6] . Moreover, the function log det[P −1 ] is convex for any positive definite matrix P [5] . Hence, Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 1, convexity of the solution space, and convexity of the objective function. Remark 2 Note that the constant a ∈ (0, 1) in Corollary 1 must be fixed before solving (8) . This constant is, in fact, a variable of the optimization problem. However, to convexify the cost and linearize some of the constraints, we fix its value before solving (8) and search over a ∈ (0, 1) to find the optimal P * . The latter increases the computations needed to find P * ; however, because a ∈ (0, 1) (a bounded set), the required grid is of reasonable size. Indeed, we are interested in selecting the a ∈ (0, 1) that leads to the asymptotic ellipsoid with minimum volume.
In Figure 1 , we illustrate the potential tightness of the ellipsoidal outer approximations obtained using Corollary 1. The solid gray area is the actual reachable set obtained by extensive Monte Carlo simulations, and the ellipsoidal approximation is depicted with dashed lines. This figure corresponds to an LTI system driven by two peak bounded perturbation. The exact numerical values of the system matrices and the perturbations' bounds can be found in [16, Section 4] .
System & Monitor Description
In this section, we introduce the system dynamics that we consider, the monitor that we use to pinpoint attacks, and the control scheme.
System Dynamics
Consider the LTI perturbed system
with sampling time-instants
p , E, and F of appropriate dimensions, and unknown system and sensor perturbations v ∈ R q and η ∈ R m , respectively. The perturbations are assumed to be peak bounded, i.e., v T k v k ≤v and η T k η k ≤η for some known v,η ∈ R >0 and all k ∈ N. The pair (A p , B p ) is stabilizable and (A p , C p ) is detectable. At the time-instants t k , k ∈ N, the output of the process y(t k ) is sampled and transmitted over a communication network. The received outputȳ(t k ) is used to compute control actions u(t k ) which are sent back to the actuators. The complete control-loop is assumed to be performed instantaneously, i.e., sampling, transmission, and arrival timeinstants are equal. In this manuscript, we focus on false data injection attacks on sensor measurements. That is, in between transmission and reception of sensor data, an attacker may inject data to the signals coming from sensors to the controller, see Fig. 6 . The opponent compromises up to s sensors, s ∈ {1, . . . , m} of the system. Denote the attacker's sensor selection matrix Γ ∈ R m×s , Γ ⊆ {γ 1 , . . . , γ m } where γ i ∈ R m×1 denotes the i-th vector of the canonical basis of R m . After each transmission and reception, the networked outputȳ takes the form:
where δ(t k ) ∈ R s denotes additive sensor attacks/faults.
, and δ k := δ(t k ). Using this new notation, the attacked system is written in the following compact form:
Filter and Residual
In this manuscript, we aim at characterizing the effect that false data injection attacks can induce in the system without being detected by standard fault-detectors. The main idea behind fault detection is the use of an estimator to forecast the evolution of the system state. If the difference between what it is measured and the output estimation is larger than expected, there may be a fault in or an attack on the system. Here, to estimate the state of the process, we use the filter:
with estimated statex ∈ R n ,x 1 = (C p ) + y 1 , where (C p ) + denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of C p , and filter gain matrix L ∈ R n×m . Define the estimation error e k := x p k −x k . Given the system dynamics (11) and the filter (12) , the estimation error is governed by the following difference equation
The pair (A p , C p ) is detectable; hence, the observer gain
which evolves according to the difference equation:
3.3 Distance Measure, Anomaly Detection, and System Monitor
The input to any detection procedure is a distance measure z k ∈ R, i.e., a measure of how deviated the estimator is from the attack-free system dynamics [13] . Here, we use a quadratic form of the residual as distance measure. Consider the residual sequence r k and some positive definite matrix Π ∈ R m×m . Define the distance measure z k := r T k Πr k and consider the following monitor.
System Monitor:
Design parameter: positive semidefinite matrix Π ∈ R m×m . Output: alarm time(s)k.
Thus, the monitor is designed so that alarms are triggered if z k exceeds one. The matrix Π must be selected such that, after sufficiently large number of time-steps (enough to allow transients to settle down), z k ≤ 1 in the attack-free case. That is, after transients due to initial conditions have decreased to a desired level, the ellipsoid r Note that the tighter the ellipsoidal bound, the less opportunity the attacker has to manipulate the system without being detected. Here, we use Corollary 1 to design an optimal matrix Π (in terms of tightness of the ellipsoidal bound). In particular, using Corollary 1, we obtain an outer time-varying ellipsoidal approximation of the reachable set of the estimation error (13) driven by v k and η k in the attack-free case (δ k = 0). Once we have this ellipsoid, using the S-procedure [5] , we project it onto the residual hyperplane to get the ellipsoid r T k Πr k = 1 of the monitor. For transparency, these results are presented in the appendix. We need, however, the following assumption for the subsequent sections. Assumption 1 In the attack-free case (δ k = 0), there exists some k * ∈ N such that the matrix Π of the monitor satisfies r T k Πr k ≤ 1 ∀ k ≥ k * and r k solution of (15) .
In the appendix, we give tools for obtaining a matrix Π satisfying Assumption 1 for a desired k * as a function of the initial estimation error e 1 and a desired tightness level of the ellipsoidal bound. 
Dynamic Output Feedback Controller
We consider general dynamic output feedback controllers of the form:
with controller state x c ∈ R n , networked outputȳ, control input u, and controller matrices (A c , B c , C c , D c ) of appropriate dimensions. For simplicity, we only consider controllers with the same order as the plant. This is particulary important in the synthesis section of the manuscript (however, results for general order controllers can be derived following the same approach). The closed-loop system (11), (12) , (17) can be written in terms of the estimation error e k = x k −x k as follows:
Analysis Tools: Attacker's Reachable Sets
In this section, we provide tools for quantifying (for
) the impact of the attack δ k on the state of the system when the monitor (16) is used for attack detection. We are interested in attacks that keep the monitor from raising alarms. This class of attacks is what we refer to as stealthy attacks. Here, we characterize ellipsoidal bounds on the set of states that stealthy attacks can induce in the system. In particular, we provide tools based on Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) for computing ellipsoidal bounds on the reachable set of the attack sequence given the system dynamics, the control strategy, the system monitor, and the set of sensors being attacked.
Assumption 2
We assume that the attack to system (11), (12) , (17) starts at k = k * (the monitor convergence time), i.e., the system has been operating without attacks for sufficiently long time so that the residual trajectories r k , for k ≥ k * , are contained in the monitor ellipsoid {r ∈ R m |r T Πr ≤ 1} before an attack occurs.
The attacker can compromise up to s sensors, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}, of the system. Consider the monitor (16) and write z k in terms of the estimation error e k and δ k :
where Π 1 2 is the symmetric square root matrix of Π and · denotes Euclidian norm. The set of feasible attack sequences that the attacker can launch while satisfying z k ≤ 1 (i.e., without raising alarms by the monitor) can be written as the constrained control problem on δ k :
Define the extended state
) the solution of (18) at time instant k ≥ k * given the extended state at the starting attack instant ζ k * and the infinite disturbance and attack sequences
corresponding to the plant trajectories, i.e., the solution x p k of (18) . We are interested in the state trajectories that the attacker can induce in the system restricted to satisfy (20) . To this end, we introduce the notion of stealthy reachable set:
(21) In this manuscript, we propose to use the volume of the set R x Γ,k as a security metric. However, in general, it is not tractable to compute R x Γ,k exactly. Instead, we look for an outer approximation E
In particular, for some positive definite P x Γ ∈ R n×n and nonnegative function α x k , we look for outer ellipsoidal approximations of the form E
k contains all the possible trajectories that stealthy attacks of the form (20) can induce in the system. Because, for LTI systems can be computed efficiently using LMIs, we use the volume of E x Γ,k as an approximation of the proposed security metric. This approximation allows us to quantify the potential "damage" that sensor attacks can induce to the system in terms of the set of sensors being compromised (the attacker's sensor selection matrix Γ). In Figure 3 , we depict a schematic representation of the proposed ideas.
Analysis Tools
In (15), the residual is given by r k = C p e k + Γδ k + F η k . Because Γ has full column rank by construction, we can write the attack sequence as
+ denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of Γ, and the closed-loop dynamics (18) as
Define the matrices:
(25) Then, the closed-loop dynamics can be written in terms of the extended state
Denote by ψ
) the solution of (26) at time instant k ≥ k * given the extended state at the starting attack instant ζ k * and the infinite residual and disturbance sequences r(·) := {r 1 , r 2 , . . .}, η(·), and v(·). Define the reachable set:
(27) The set R ζ Γ,k is the reachable set of an LTI system driven by peak-bounded perturbations. Therefore, we can use Corollary 1 to obtain outer approximations of the form
Remark 3
We are ultimately interested in the stealthy reachable set of the plant states R
, monitor matrix Π, perturbations boundsv,η ∈ R >0 , and attack selection matrix Γ. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants
and the ellipsoid E ζ Γ,k has minimum volume in the sense of Corollary 1.
Proof: Consider the reachable set R ζ Γ,k in (27) . The set R ζ Γ,k is the reachable set of system (26) , which is a LTI system driven by peak-bounded perturbations. It follows that, under the conditions stated in Theorem 1, Corollary 1 can be used to obtain outer ellipsoidal approximations of the form 
We use Lemma 10 in the Appendix to obtain this projection. 
By Lemma 10 in the Appendix, the projection of ζ
Thus, in light of Remark 3, the trajectories of the plant dynamics are contained in E
Distance to Critical States: Analysis
As a second security metric, we propose to use the minimum distance between R x Γ,k and a possible set of critical states C
x -states that, if reached, compromise the integrity or safe operation of the system. Such a region might represent states in which, for example, the pressure of a holding vessel exceeds its pressure rating or the level of a liquid in a tank exceeds its capacity. However, because R x Γ,k is not known exactly, this distance cannot be directly computed. Instead, once the ellipsoidal bound E
x and use this d gives us intuition of how far the actual reachable set R
The set of critical states in many practical applications can be captured through the union of half-spaces defined by their boundary hyperplanes:
where each pair (c i ,
. . , N quantifies a hyperplane that defines a single half-space.
Corollary 3 Consider the set of critical states C x defined in (28) and the matrix P 
(29) Proof: The minimum distance between an ellipsoid centered at the origin {x ∈ R n |x T Px = 1}, P ∈ R n×n , P > 0 and a hyperplane {x ∈ R n |c T x = b}, c ∈ R n , b ∈ R is given by the formula (|b| − √ c T P −1 c)/c T c, [19, 20] . It follows that the minimum distance between D x , conformed by the N hyperplanes in (28) , and E 
and the set of critical states C x do not intersect; if d
x Γ,k = 0, they touch at a point only; and d x Γ,k < 0 implies that they intersect. In Figure 4 , we depict a schematic representation of these ideas. Note that, due to potential conservatism of the ellipsoidal bounds, d 
Simulation Results
Consider the closed-loop system (18) T to the performance output s k = 0.25x
k is upper bounded by γ = 3. We use the results in the appendix to design the monitor matrix Π so that, for k > k * = 10, r k Πr k ≤ 1. Using Theorem 1, we obtain E ζ Γ,k for all the possible combinations of the sensor attack selection matrix Γ. Once we have E ζ Γ,k , using Corollary 2, Figure 5 , we show the projection of E x Γ,∞ onto the (x p,2 , x p,3 )-hyperplane for different sets of sensor being attacked. Figure 6 depicts the projection of E x Γ,∞ onto the (x p,1 , x p,2 )-hyperplane and the distance to the set of critical states C x = {x p ∈ R 3 |x p,1 ≤ −15}. In Table 1 , we give the numerical values of the volume of E x Γ,∞ and the distance to the critical states depicted in Figure 6 for different sensors being attacked. Note that some distances are negative, as explained in Remark 4, negative distances imply that there is a nonempty intersection between the critical states and the stealthy reachable set. That is, there exist attack sequences that can drive the system to the unsafe region without being detected by the system monitor. Assume, for instance, that two out of the three sensors can be completely secured, i.e., attacks to these sensors are impossible. From Table 1 , we note that attacks to sensor two leads to the largest volume of E x Γ,∞ and the smallest distance to critical states d x Γ,∞ . Therefore, if only two sensors can be secured, they should be sensors two and three. Following the same logic, if only one sensor can be secured, then sensor two must be selected because attacks to the remaining sensors, one and three, lead to the smallest E impact of stealthy attacks on the system dynamics is minimized. In particular, we design κ to minimize the volume of E x Γ,k (thus decreasing the size of R x Γ,k ) while guaranteeing some attack-free prescribed performance of the closed-loop system.
Remark 5
We present synthesis results in terms of the sensor attack selection matrix Γ. That is, for given Γ, we provide synthesis tools to design optimal controllers and monitors -optimal in terms of minimal volume E x Γ,∞ for a desired attack-free closed-loop system performance. Note, however, that we do not have access to Γ in practice, i.e., because we assume stealthy attacks, the set of sensors being attacked is unknown to the system designer. Nevertheless, once we have derived synthesis results for given Γ, we provide general guidelines for using these results to synthesize controllers/monitors for unknown matrix Γ. In particular, we propose techniques from sensor protection placement in power systems [10, 18] ; and game-theoretic techniques [4] . 
Consider the extended attacker's reachable set R ζ Γ,k defined in (27) with matrices (A, B) as in (25) (A, B) , the constants (a 1 , a 2 , b), and the matrices P and Π solution of the optimization problem:
) are now variables, the blocks PA, PB, and bΠ in (31) are nonlinear in (κ, P). Following the results in [34] , we propose an invertible linearizing change of variables: (32) such that, in the new variables ν, the objective in (31) is convex and the restrictions are affine. In particular, for P > 0 and the nonlinear matrix inequality L ≥ 0 defined in (31), we aim at finding two invertible matrices T 1 and T 2 such that the congruence transformations P → T 
Change of Variables, Constraints, and Objective Function
To address the synthesis problem, we impose some structure on the matrix P. Let P be positive definite and of the form
with X, U,X, S ∈ R n×n and positive definite X,X, and S. Define the matrices:
(34) Using block matrix inversion formulas, it is easy to verify that Y X + V U T = I and Y U + VX = 0, which leads to Y T X = Z. Define the matrices T 1 ∈ R 3n×3n and T 2 ∈ R 9n×9n as
Then, P → T T 1 PT 1 and L → T T 2 LT 2 take the form:
The structure of P(ν) follows from symmetry of P, which implies symmetric X and Y and XY + U V T = I. Note that the block T 
and define the change of controller, observer, and monitor variables:
Then, T T 1 PAT 1 can be written as
and the block W ai as
Therefore, under T 1 , T 2 , and the new variables in (40), the blocks transforms as
with P(ν), A(ν), B(ν), and W(ν) as defined in (37), (41), (42), and (43), respectively. That is, the original blocks, PA and PB, that depend non-linearly on the decision variables (κ, P) are transformed into blocks that are affine functions of the new variables ν. If ν is given and U and V are invertible, the change of variables in (40) and the matrix T 1 are invertible and thus (κ, P) can be constructed from ν and they are unique. Moreover, invertible V implies that T 1 and T 2 are nonsingular and thus the transformations P → T 
If the matrix P(ν) is positive definite, by the Schur complement, Y > 0 and X − Y −1 > 0, and because Y X + V U T = I by construction (see Eq. (34)), V U T = I −Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V U T is nonsingular. Therefore, if P(ν) > 0, it is always possible to find nonsingular U and V satisfying Y X + V U T = I. In the following lemma, we summarize the discussion presented above.
Lemma 2 Consider the observer, monitor, and controller matrices κ = (L, Π, A c , B c , C c , D c ), and the matrices L and P as defined in (31) and (33), respectively. If there exists ν = (X, Y, S, R, G, K, O, M, N ) satisfying P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 with P(ν) and L(ν) as defined in (37) and (46), respectively; then, there exists (κ, P) satisfying P > 0 and L ≥ 0. Moreover, for every ν such that P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0, the change of variables in (40) and matrix T 1 are invertible and the (κ, P) obtained by inverting (37) and (40) is unique.
Proof: Assume that ν is such that P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0. Because P(ν) > 0, by the Schur complement, Y > 0 and X − Y −1 > 0. Since Y X + V U T = I, then V U T = I − Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V U T is invertible. Hence, it is always possible to factorize I − Y X as V U T = I − Y X with square and nonsingular U and V . Invertible U and V implies that T 1 and T 2 are square and nonsingular and thus the transformations P → T
It follows that P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 imply P > 0 and L ≥ 0 because P(ν) and L(ν) have the same signature as P and L, respectively. Because P(ν) > 0, the matrices U , V , and S are nonsingular. This implies that the change of variables in (40) and T 1 are invertible and lead to unique (κ, P) by inverting (37) and (40).
So far, we have derived from the analysis inequalities, P > 0 and L ≥ 0 in (31), the synthesis inequalities P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0 defined in (37) and (46). If we find a realization of ν satisfying the synthesis inequalities, we factorize I − Y X into nonsingular matrices V and U satisfying I − Y X = V U T , use these V and U to solve the equations in (40) to obtain the controller, observer, and monitor matrices, and invert (37) to obtain the ellipsoid matrix P. By Lemma 2, this (κ, P) satisfies the analysis inequalities in (31) . We aim at minimizing the number of states that the attacker can induce in the system while remaining stealthy, i.e., we want to make the "size" of R x Γ,k defined in (21) as small as possible by selecting ν. To achieve this, we seek for the ν that minimizes the volume of E x Γ,∞ (which would decrease the size of R x Γ,k ). In the analysis case, we look for the matrix P satisfying P > 0 and L ≥ 0 leading to the ellipsoid (27) ) and then, using Corollary 2, we project this E ζ Γ,k onto the x p -hyperplane to obtain E x Γ,k . To follow the same approach for synthesis, we would need to minimize the volume of ζ T Pζ = α ζ ∞ subject to P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0. However, the matrix P cannot be written in terms of ν and minimizing the volume of ζ T P(ν)ζ = α ζ ∞ is not an equivalent objective. Instead, because the projection E x Γ,k can be written in terms of ν, we seek to minimize the volume of E x Γ,∞ directly.
T , and α ζ k ∈ R >0 , k ∈ N. The projection of E ζ Γ,k onto the x p -hyperplane is given by the el- (34) . Proof: For P as defined in (33), by Lemma 10 in the ap-pendix, the boundary of the projection of E ζ Γ,k onto the
Using standard block matrix inversion formulas (see, e.g., [15] ) and the definition of Y in (34), we have Y = (X − UX −1 U T ) −1 and therefore E x Γ,k can be written in terms of ν as E
Lemma 3 implies that, in the new variables, we can minimize the volume of (
∞ to reduce the size of R x Γ,k . Therefore, in the synthesis case, we seek to minimize the volume of ( [19] . Moreover, the function det [Y ] shares the same minimizer with log det[Y ] [5] . However, the function log det[Y ] is concave for any positive definite matrix Y . To overcome this obstacle, we look for a convex upper bound on det [Y ] and minimize this bound instead. In order to derive this bound, we use the Arithmetic Mean-Geometric Mean (AM-GM) Inequality which states the following: For any sequence of positive real numbers, c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n , the inequality (
c j is satisfied [36] .
Lemma 4 For any positive definite matrix Y ∈ R n×n , the following is satisfied: Up to this point, we have the necessary tools for selecting ν to reduce the size of the stealthy reachable set R x Γ,k . That is, we have the constraints, P(ν) > 0 and L(ν) ≥ 0, and the cost function, trace [Y ] , needed to cast the optimization problem to minimize the volume of E x Γ,∞ . There is, however, one last ingredient to be considered before casting the complete synthesis optimization problem; namely, the attack-free performance of the closed-loop dynamics.
Attack-Free Observer, Monitor, and Controller Performance
As we now move towards posing the complete syntheses optimization problem, we note that as ||L|| → 0, ||B c || → 0, and ||D c || → 0, the reachable set R x Γ,k converges to the empty set because the attack-dependent terms in (18) vanish. To make this concrete, without any other considered criteria, the matrices (L, A c , B c ) leading to the smallest E x Γ,k are trivially given by (L, A c , B c ) = 0. While this is effective at eliminating the impact of the attacker, it implies that we discard the observer and the controller altogether and, therefore, forfeit any ability to control the system and build a reliable estimate of the state. If there are performance specifications that the observer, monitor, and controller must satisfy in the attack-free case (e.g., convergence speed, perturbation-output gain, and closed-loop dynamics spectrum), they have to be added as extra constraints into the minimization problem posted to minimize the volume of E x Γ,∞ . Several time and frequency domain performance specifications for LTI systems have been expressed as LMI constraints on the closed-loop state-space matrices and quadratic Lyapunov functions [34] . Here, our goal is to compute a single observer (12) , monitor (16) , and controller (17) that: 1) meets the required attack-free performance specifications, and 2) decreases the set of states reachable by stealthy attackers. For LTI systems and some of the most frequently used performance specifications (e.g., general quadratic performance [34] ), there are analysis and synthesis results of the form: System Σ satisfies the performance specification γ j if there exists a Lyapunov matrix P j that satisfies some LMIs in P j . If our synthesis problem involves N specifications, γ 1 , . . . , γ N , by collecting the LMIs of each specification, we end up having a set of matrix inequalities whose variables are the observer, monitor, and controller matrices, and the Lyapunov matrices, P 1 , . . . , P N , of the specifications (plus auxiliary variables depending on the performance criteria). To pose a tractable co-design considering the volume of E x Γ,k and the specification γ j , we must rewrite the specification Lyapunov matrix P j and its corresponding LMIs in terms of the synthesis variables ν. This can be achieved by imposing P j = T T j PT j , where P is the Lyapunov-like matrix associated with E x Γ,k in (33) and T j denotes some linear transformation. By doing so, we can write the specification LMIs in terms of P and use the change of variables in (40) and the transformations T 1 and T 2 in (35)- (36) to write these LMIs in terms of ν.
Remark 6
In this manuscript, as attack-free performance specifications, we consider the spectrum of the estimation error dynamics for the observer and, for the controller, the L 2 gain from the vector of perturbations to some performance output. We remark that any other specification γ j can be considered in our framework as long as the corresponding Lyapunov matrix P j and the LMIs can be written in terms of the synthesis variables ν. In Ref. [34] , the authors provide a synthesis framework for general quadratic performance -which covers H 2 /H ∞ performance, passivity, asymptotic disturbance rejection, peak impulse response, peak-to-peak gain, nominal/robust regulation, and closed-loop pole location. The framework here and the one in [34] are compatible in the sense that any performance specification considered in [34] can be written as LMIs in terms of our syntheses variables ν. Attack-Free Monitor Feasibility. Note that the observer gain L and the monitor matrix Π must be chosen such that Assumption 1 is satisfied. That is, the pair (L, Π) must be selected such that, in the attack-free case (δ k = 0), there exists some k * ∈ N satisfying r T k Πr k ≤ 1 for all k ≥ k * and r k solution of (15) . Next, we provide constraints in the syntheses variables ν that have to be fulfilled to satisfy Assumption 1. Lemma 5 Consider the system matrices (A p , C p , E, F ) and the perturbation boundsv,η ∈ R >0 . Assume no attacks to the system, i.e., δ k = 0. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), constant α e ∞ := (2 − a)/(1 − a), and ∈ R >0 , if there exist constants a 1 , a 2 ∈ R and matrices S ∈ R n×n , G ∈ R m×m , and R ∈ R n×m satisfying:
∞ ≤ } and e 1 denotes the initial estimation error in (15) . The proof of Lemma 5 is given in the appendix. The constant determines the tightness of the monitor, i.e., the smaller the the tighter the bound r Attack-Free Observer Performance. For the observer, we simply consider the speed of convergence of the estimation error to steady state as a performance criteria. This is quantified by the eigenvalues of the matrix (A p − LC p ). We restrict the values that L might take by enforcing that the eigenvalues of (A p − LC p ) are contained in a disk, Disk[β, τ ], centered at β + 0i with radius τ . We give a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the synthesis variables, R and S, to achieve this performance.
Lemma 6 [Observer Performance][11]
Consider the system matrices (A p , C p ). If there exist S ∈ R n×n and R ∈ R n×m satisfying:
(49) then, the eigenvalues of (A p − LC p ) with L = S −1 R are contained in the closed disk Disk[β, τ ] centered at β + 0i with radius τ .
Attack-Free Controller Performance. For the controller, we consider the L 2 gain of the closed-loop system from the vector of perturbations,
T ∈ R m+n , to some performance output, say s k ∈ R g , in the attack-free case (i.e., δ k = 0). Define the matrices
and the performance output
g×m , and D 2 ∈ R g×n . Then, the closed-loop dynamics (11), (17) can be written in terms of the extended statẽ
, the vector of perturbations d k , and the performance output s k :
The L 2 gain of system (51) equals the H ∞ norm of the transfer matrix H(s) :=D +C(sI −Ã) −1B , see [35] . Lemma 7 [Bounded-Real Lemma] Consider the closedloop system (51) with input d k and output s k . If there exist X ∈ R 2n×2n and γ ∈ R >0 satisfying:
then, the L 2 gain of system (51) is less than or equal to γ, i.e., sup
The proof of Lemma 7 is omitted here. It is a standard result and details about the proof can be found in, for instance, [5] , [35] , and references therein. Using the analysis inequalities in (52), we derive the corresponding synthesis constraints in terms of the syn-thesis variables ν. Consider the matrices X and Y introduced in (34) , the change of variables in (40a), and the attack-free closed-loop system matrices (Ã,B,C,D) above defined. Define the matrices:
n×n , M ∈ R m×n , and N ∈ R l×m , and constant γ ∈ R >0 satisfying:
(54) then, the change of variables in (40a) and the matrix Y in (34) are invertible and the matrices (X , A c , B
satisfy (52) and lead to sup
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in the appendix.
Synthesis of Secure Control Systems
Finally, combining the results above presented, we cast the complete optimization problem to minimize the volume of the asymptotic approximation E x Γ,∞ of R x Γ,k as a function of the set of sensor being attacked (the sensor selection matrix Γ) while guaranteing certain attack-free system performance. Theorem 2 Consider (A p , B p , C p , E, F ) (the system matrices), the perturbations boundsv,η ∈ R >0 , and the attack sensor selection matrix Γ. For given a, b ∈ (0, 1), α
l×m , solution of the convex optimization:
, (monitor feasibility), (49), (observer performance),
with P(ν), L(ν),X(ν), and S(ν) as defined in (37), (46), (53), and (54), respectively; then, the transformation T 1 in ( (31) and (33), respectively, and are unique. Moreover, by assumption, (48) is fulfilled. Then, by Lemma 5, the residual dynamics (15) satisfies r e 1 , S) , and Π = G and L = S −1 R. Therefore, by Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and 
Observer, Monitor, Controller, and EllipsoidalApproximation Reconstruction. Given a solution (ν, a 1 , a 2 ) of the optimization problem in (55): (1) For given X and Y , compute via singular value decomposition a full rank factorization V U T = I − Y X with square and nonsingular V and U . (2) For given ν and invertible V and U , solve the system of equations T T 1 PT 1 = P(ν) and (40) to obtain the matrices (P,
(3) For given S, Y , P, e 1 , , and a, obtain the monitor convergence time k * , and P 
By Theorem 2, the reconstructed matrices satisfy the attack-free system performance, and minimize an upper bound on the volume of E x Γ,∞ .
Remark 7 To obtain tighter approximations
) are computed using Theorem 2 and the above reconstruction procedure, we can close the loop using these matrices and use the analysis result in Theorem 1 to obtain tighter approximations. That is, Theorem 2 could be used for synthesis only, and then, once (L, Π, A c , B c , C c , D c ) are computed, we could use the analysis result in Theorem 1 to obtain less conservative approximations of R x Γ,k . Remark 8 Note that the constants a, b, , τ, β, and γ in Theorem 2 must be fixed before solving the synthesis optimization problem in (55). The constants (τ, β, γ) determine the attack-free observer and controller performance. The constant determines the tightness of the monitor in the attack-free case. The smaller the the tighter the monitor (see Remark 10 in the Appendix for details). Finally, a, b ∈ (0, 1) are, in fact, variables of the optimization problem. However, to linearize some of the constraints, we fix their value before solving (55) and search over a, b ∈ (0, 1) to find the optimal ν. The latter increases the computations needed to find the optimal ν; however, because a, b ∈ (0, 1) (a bounded set), the required grid in (a, b) is of reasonable size.
Distance to Critical States: Synthesis
As a second cost function for synthesis, we consider the distance between R x Γ,k and a possible set of critical states C x . Because R x Γ,k is not known exactly, we consider the distance from the approximation E x Γ,k to C x and use this distance as cost function. We capture the set of critical states through the union of half-spaces defined by their boundary hyperplanes as introduced in (28) . In the analysis case, we compute the minimum distance, d
x Γ,k , between E x Γ,k and C x and use this distance to approximate the proposed security metric (the distance between R x Γ,k and C x ). For synthesis, however, the distance d x Γ,k is highly nonlinear and not convex/concave in the syntheses variables ν. Instead, we consider the minimum distance between each hyperplane conforming C x and the asymptotic ellipsoidal approximation, E 
. . , N quantifies a hyperplane that defines a single half-space. The minimum distance d Proof: The assertion follows by the same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 3.
For synthesis, we aim at maximizing a 1 , a 2 ) subject to (55b). The constant ρ i assigns a priority weight to the distance d
and
k is nonlinear and not convex/concave in the matrix Y . However, because a ∈ (0, 1), we can maximize the weighted sum of the asymptotic minimum distances between E x Γ,k and c
is strictly positive and Y is positive definite, maximizingd Γ is equivalent to minimizing the linear function:
Next, as a corollary of Theorem 2, we pose the optimization problem required to maximizẽ d Γ while guaranteeing the required attack-free performance. Corollary 4 Consider the setting stated in Theorem 2, the set of critical states C x defined in (28), andd Γ above defined for some
If there exists (ν, a 1 , a 2 ) solution of the optimization: 
Controller/Monitor Selection for Unknown Γ
The synthesis results presented above are derived for given sensor attack selection matrix Γ, see Remark 5. However, we do not have access to Γ in practice, i.e., the set of sensors being attacked is usually unknown to the system designer. Next, we provide general guidelines for using the results given above to synthesize controllers/monitors when Γ is unknown. We propose two sets of techniques: sensor protection placement methods [10, 18] ; and game-theoretic techniques [4] . Sensor Protection Placement. This technique was originally introduced for power system [10, 18] . The prob- lem is the following: assuming that the system designer has limited security resources to completely encrypt and secure a subset of sensors (i.e., attacks to those sensors are impossible), how to select which sensors to secure in order to minimize the effect of stealthy attacks on the system performance. In exactly the same sense, we have shown in the analysis example in Section 4.3 that our analysis tools can be used to allocate security equipment to sensors when limited resources are available so that the size of the stealthy reachable set is minimized. Now, in the syntheses setting, we address a slightly different problem: for given m sensors and a limited number of sensors that can be securedm ∈ {1, . . . , m}, which sensors should be selected such that the optimal controller/monitor corresponding to attacks to all the remaining m −m sensors leads to the smallest stealthy reachable set (or the largest distance to critical states) among all subsets of m −m sensors. For instance, assume that we have three sensors, m = 3, andm = 1 of them can be secured. Then, among all subsets of sensors J ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with cardinality card[J] = m −m = 2 (i.e., J ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}), select the controller/monitor κ J ∈ {κ {1,2} , κ {1,3} , κ {2,3} } that leads to the smallest asymptotic ellipsoid E
corresponding to the solution of (55) for Γ = Γ J , and Γ J ∈ {Γ {1,2} , Γ {1,3} , Γ {2,3} } is the attack selection matrix corresponding to attacks on sensors J. That is, we compute optimal controllers/monitors and corresponding asymptotic ellipsoids (κ J , E x J ) for all J ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, and select the controller κ J that leads to the smallest E x J . In the following algorithm, we summarize the ideas introduced above. 
where Vol[E Note that the selected controller/monitor κ * m in (57) is parametrized bym, the number of sensors that can be secured; and that in the casem = 0 (no sensors can be secured), Γ J = Γ {1,...,m} = I m , i.e., the selected controller/monitor κ * 0 is a worst-case controller that assumes all sensors are attacked. We remark that Algorithm 1 could be used using the largest distance to critical statesd Γ as cost to be maximized instead of minimizing Vol[E for Γ = Γ J and κ = κ I . That is, E x Γ,∞ | Γ=Γ J ,κ=κ I is the asymptotic ellipsoidal approximation of the stealthy reachable set R x Γ,k for Γ = Γ J and κ = κ I , and κ I is the controller/monitor κ corresponding to the solution of (55) in Theorem 2 for Γ = Γ I . Note that, by construction, κ I minimizes the cost h I,I but is not optimal for h I,J , I = J. Next, using the notation introduced above, we cast the controller/monitor selection as a two players noncooperative zero-sum matrix game [4] , where player one (the defender) has strategy setκ, player two (the attacker) has strategy setΓ, and the cost matrix of the game is H := {h I,J } ∈ Rm ×m . Define the tuple K := ({1}, {2}, . . . , {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, . . . , m}) indexed as K 1 = {1}, K 2 = {2}, Km = {1, . . . , m}, and so on. Then, elements of the game matrix H(i, j), i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, correspond to h Ki,Kj , i.e., there is a one-to-one correspondence between H(i, j) and h Ki,Kj . Hereafter, we only use entries H(i, j), i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, of the matrix game without making reference to the corresponding sets (K i , K j ); indeed, the strategy of the defender associated with H(i, j) is κ Ki , and the one of the attacker is Γ Kj . If the defender chooses strategy i (the i-th row of H) and the attacker the strategy j (the j-th column of H), the outcome of the game is H(i, j) . Here, the defender seeks to minimize the outcome of the game, while the attacker aims at maximizing it, both by independent decisions. Note that this game is only played once, the controller is selected before the system starts operating and it is not changed during the operation. Then, a reasonable strategy for the defender is to secure his losses against any (rational or irrational) behavior of the attacker [4] . Under this strategy, the defender selects the strategy i * ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the i * -row of H, whose largest entry is no bigger than the largest entry of any other row. Therefore, if the defender chooses the i * -th row as his strategy, where i * satisfies the inequalities:
then, his looses are no greater thanf , which is referred in the literature as the ceiling of the defender or the security level for the defender's losses [4] . The strategy "row i * " (the controller/monitor κ K i * ) that yields this security level is called the security strategy of the defender. For every matrix game H, the security level of the defender's losses is unique, and there exists at least one security strategy [4] . Using the security strategy κ K i * (where i * satisfies (58)) as the selected controller/monitor is the best rational strategy that can be taken under the assumptions of the game (i.e., noncooperative, played only once, and independent decisions). Note that the attacker has also a security strategy that secures his gains against any strategy of the defender. However, whether he plays that strategy (or not) would not chance the security strategy of the defender. Here, we use the security strategy κ K i * described above as the selected controller/monitor. An alternative formulation is to assign probabilities to every strategy of the attacker and select the defender's strategy that minimizes the expected value of the game. Define the vector of probabilities p := (p 1 , . . . , pm)
T , p j ≥ 0, m j=1 p j = 1, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, where p j denotes the probability that the attacker uses strategy j (the jth column of H). These probabilities have to be assigned by the defender given the system configuration. For instance, if sensors are geographically distributed (e.g., in power/water networks), some of them could be completely inaccessible and some others might be easier to reach/hack. Another option is to assign higher probabilities to attacks on single sensors than on groups of them. Simply because it might be easier to hack one sensor than more than one. Thus, the system designer has to assign smaller/larger probabilities to every sensor of the system. Note that for a given defender's strategy i, the value of the game is H(i, 1) with probability p 1 , H(i, 2) with probability p 2 , H(i,m) with probability pm, and so on. Then, for this i-th row strategy, the expected value of the game is given by H(i, * )p, where H(i, * ) ∈ R 1×m denotes the i-th row of the game matrix H. The defender selects the strategy i * ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the i * -row of H, that minimizes the expected value of the game, i.e.,
We use the strategy "row i * " (the controller/monitor κ K i * ) as the chosen controller/monitor. Note that this strategy might lead to a better outcome of the game (for the defender) with certain "optimal" probability. However, there is also a nonzero probability of doing worse than with the deterministic formulation presented above. This might be a risk worth taking to improve the security of the system. We remark that the matrix game H could be constructed using the largest distance to critical statesd Γ instead of Vol[E x Γ,∞ ]. In that case, the defender seeks to maximize the distance and the attacker aims at minimizing it. Table 2 , we present the volume of the asymptotic approximation E x for all possible combinations of sensors being attacked. We show results for the original κ in (30) ; and for the optimal κ ob-tained using Theorem 2 and Corollary 4. Note that the improvement is remarkable using the optimal κ. To illustrate this improvement, in Figure 7 , we show the projection of E x Γ,∞ onto the (x p,1 , x p,2 )-hyperplane for sensors {2},{2,3}, and {1,2,3} being attacked. We depict the projections for both the original κ in (30) and the optimal one (minimizing trace [Y ] ). For sensor {2}, we have a 67% improvement in volume and 142% in distance; for {2,3}, 88% and 247%; and for {1,2,3}, 67% and 92%, respectively. Once we have all the optimal controllers/monitors and the corresponding costs in Table 2 , we can use Algorithm 1 in Section 5.5 (the sensor protection placement method ) to select the best κ given a number of sensors that can be completely securedm. Ifm = 1; then, according to Algorithm 1, sensor two should be the one to be secured because κ = κ 1,3 (the optimal controller/monitor assuming sensors {1, 3} are attacked) leads to the smallest volume (137.44), see Table 2 . On the other hand, if distance to critical states is more important, the selected controller/monitor should be κ 2,3 (i.e., securing sensor one) because it leads to the largest distance (9.74). Following the same logic, if two sensors can be secured,m = 2, they should be sensors two and three, in terms of volume, and sensors one and two, in terms of distance, i.e., we should select controllers/monitors κ 1 (minimum volume) and κ 3 (maximum distance), respectively. Next, following the game-theoretic formulation in Section 5.5, using Theorem 2 for to all possible combinations of Γ, we compute all optimal controllers/monitors and the corresponding volumes of the ellipsoidal outer approximations. We use these volumes to construct the matrix game H (given in Table 3 ) as introduced in Section 5.5. Note that some entries of H are hyphens. This indicates that the optimization problem used to compute the ellipsoidal approximation was not feasible for that combination of controller/monitor and Γ. From this H, using 58, it is easy to verify that the security level for the defender's losses is 1538.31 which corresponds to controller/monitor κ {1,2,3} (the the security strategy of the defender ), see Table 3 . That is, by selecting κ {1,2,3} , we ensure having a worst-case volume of 1538.31 regardless of what sensors the attacker compromises. Finally, we assign probabilities to the strategies of the attacker, in the sense introduced in Section 5.5, and look for the controller/monitor that minimizes the expected value of the game. Using (59), it is easy to verify that, for the vector of probabilities p = (0.4, 0.09, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.01, 0)
Simulation Results

Consider the system matrices (
T , the strategy that minimizes the expected value of the game is κ {1} , see Table 3 . This controller/monitor leads to H(1, * )p = 1135.43, which is the smallest for all H(i, * ), i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}.
Conclusion
We have provided mathematical tools -in terms of LMIs -for quantifying the potential impact of sensor stealthy attacks on the system dynamics. In particular, we have given a result for computing ellipsoidal outer approximations on the set of states that stealthy attacks can induce in the system. We have proposed to use the volume of these approximations and the distance to possible dangerous states as security metrics for NCSs. Then, for given sensor attack selection matrix Γ, we have provide synthesis tools (in terms of semidefinite programs) to redesign controllers and monitors such that the impact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required attack-free system performance is guaranteed. Based on these synthesis results, we have provided general guidelines for selecting optimal controllers/monitors when Γ is unknown. In particular, we have proposed two sets of techniques: sensor protection placement methods; and game-theoretic techniques. We have presented extensive computer simulations to illustrate the performance of our results. Table 3 Noncooperative zero-sum matrix game between the attacker and the defender as introduced in Section 5.5.
A Monitor Design
We use Corollary 1 to obtain outer time-varying ellipsoidal approximations of the reachable set of the estimation error (13) driven by v k and η k in the attack-free case (δ k = 0). Once we have this ellipsoid, we project it onto the residual hyperplane to get the ellipsoid r T k Πr k = 1 of the monitor. Denote by ψ e (k, e 1 , η(·), v(·)) the solution of (13) at time instant k given the initial estimation error e 1 and the infinite disturbance sequences η(·) := {η 1 , η 2 , . . .} and v(·) := {v 1 , v 2 , . . .}. The reachable set we seek to quantify is given by Lemma 9 Consider the estimation error dynamics (13) with matrices (A p , C p , E, F, L), the perturbation bounds v,η ∈ R >0 , and assume no attacks to the system, i.e., δ k = 0. For a given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exist constants a 1 = a * 1 , . . . , a N = a * N and matrix P = P * solution of By Lemma 9, the trajectories of the estimation error dynamics are contained in the time-varying ellipsoid e T P e e = α e k . Having this ellipsoid, we look for the matrix Π of the monitor leading to the minimum-volume ellipsoid r T Πr = 1 satisfying, for k ≥ k * and some k * ∈ N, r T k Πr k = (C p e k + η k ) T Π(C p e k + η k ) ≤ 1 for e k ∈ E e k and η k such that η * implies E e k ⊆ E e , where E e := {e ∈ R n |e T P e e ≤ α e ∞ + }, for all k ≥ k * . It follows that, for any > 0, the estimation error e k is contained in ellipsoid e T P e e = α e ∞ + for k ≥ k * , i.e., R e k ⊆ E e ∀ k ≥ k * . Therefore, for a fixed (and corresponding k * ), the problem of finding Π of the monitor amounts to finding Π such that (C p e k + η k ) T Π(C p e k + η k ) ≤ 1 for all e k and η k satisfying e then, for δ k = 0 and k ≥ k * (a, , e 1 , P e ) = min{k ∈ N|α e k − α e ∞ ≤ }, the monitor inequality r T k Πr k ≤ 1 is satisfied for all e k and η k satisfying e 
